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Abstract
The goal of an infection source node (e.g., a rumor or computer virus source) in a network is to
spread its infection to as many nodes as possible, while remaining hidden from the network administrator.
On the other hand, the network administrator aims to identify the source node based on knowledge of
which nodes have been infected. We model the infection spreading and source identification problem
as a strategic game, where the infection source and the network administrator are the two players.
As the Jordan center estimator is a minimax source estimator that has been shown to be robust in
recent works, we assume that the network administrator utilizes a source estimation strategy that can
probe any nodes within a given radius of the Jordan center. Given any estimation strategy, we design a
best-response infection strategy for the source. Given any infection strategy, we design a best-response
estimation strategy for the network administrator. We derive conditions under which a Nash equilibrium
of the strategic game exists. Simulations in both synthetic and real-world networks demonstrate that our
proposed infection strategy infects more nodes while maintaining the same safety margin between the
true source node and the Jordan center source estimator.
Index Terms
Infection source, rumor source, source identification, infection spreading, Jordan center, social net-
work.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing popularity of online social networks like Facebook, Twitter and Google+ [1]–[4],
more and more people are getting news and information via social networks instead of traditional media
outlets. According to a study from the Pew Research Center, about 30% of Americans now get news from
Facebook [5]. Due to the interactive nature of online social networks, instead of passively consuming
news, half of social networks users actively share or repost news stories, images or video, and 46% of
them discuss news issues within their social circles [5]. As a result, a piece of information or a rumor
posted by a social network user can be reposted by other users and spread quickly on the underlying
social network and reach a large number of users in a short period of time [6]–[8]. We say that such users
or nodes in the network are “infected”. A widely spread rumor or misinformation can lead to reputation
damage [9], political consequences [10], and economic damage [11]. The network administrator may
want to identify the rumor source in order to catch the culprit, control the damage, and counter the rumor
influence. Here, the term “network administrator” is used in a very broad sense to include anyone (e.g.,
regulatory authorities and researchers) who has been given access to data about the network topology
and infected nodes.
Another example of an infection spreading is that of a malicious node in a computer network whose
goal is to spread a virus throughout the network. The virus can be a spam bot that is not easily detected
[12] (e.g., when the Mariposa botnet was dismantled in 2009, it had infected over 8 million computers
[13]), and the network administrator is alerted to the virus infection only at a much later time. Motivated
by these applications, many recent research works [14]–[19] have focused on the problem of identifying
rumor or infection sources in a network under various spreading models. In all these works, the source
is assumed to be “dumb”, and whether a susceptible node becomes infected or not follows a stochastic
process that is not controlled by the source. Under this simplified assumption, the works [14]–[19] show
that source estimators can be constructed so that the true source can be identified with high probability
to within a fixed number of hops.
In many applications, the source may wish to maintain anonymity while spreading the infection to as
many users as possible. An example is the now defunct anonymous social networking app Secret [20],
which allowed smart phone users to share information and repost a posting anonymously among his
device contacts or Facebook friends. In February 2014, Secret was used to spread the false rumor that
Evernote Corporation was going to be acquired, which prompted the CEO to subsequently issued a public
denial [21]. Messaging services including Wickr [22] and FireChat [23] have been used in civil protests
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3like those in Hong Kong in 2014 [24], [25]. Government authorities may trace the initiators of certain
protest events even if the messages are encrypted through the use of source identification algorithms that
do not rely on message contents or metadata [14]–[18]. Therefore, in distributing information, civil protest
leaders may design an infection strategy that carefully controls the rate of information spreading in order
to obfuscate their identities. In the example of spam bot infection spreading, the perpetrator also wants
an infection strategy that controls the rate of the virus spreading to avoid being caught by the authorities
while spreading the virus to as many computers as possible. The recent work [26] introduces a messaging
protocol, which guarantees obfuscation of the source under the assumption that the network administrator
utilizes the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator to identify the source, and when the underlying network
is an infinite regular tree. Moreover, simulations are provided in [26] to verify the performance of the
messaging protocol on irregular trees and general networks.
With prior knowledge that the infection source may try to avoid detection, the network administrator
needs to adapt its estimation strategy to increase its chance of identifying the infection source. On the
other hand, if the source has prior knowledge of the estimation strategy, it needs to further adapt its
own infection strategy, and so on. The source and network administrator is thus playing a “hide and
seek” game of infection spreading and source identification. This complex dynamic can be modeled as a
strategic game with the source and network administrator as the two players of the game. To the best of
our knowledge, studying infection spreading and source identification as a strategic game is novel since
previous works like [14]–[19] focus only on the estimation strategy, while the work [26] focuses only
on the infection strategy.
In this paper, we study best-response strategies for both the source and network administrator for trees
from a game theoretic perspective, whereas [26] develops an order-optimal infection strategy for the
source for infinite regular trees (which are special cases of expanding trees), and extends heuristically
to more general networks. In [26], the network administrator is assumed to adopt the ML estimation
strategy, whereas we assume that the network administrator is allowed to tune a Jordan center based
estimation strategy (see Section II-A for justifications of our estimation strategy choice). In our current
work, we assume that the network administrator becomes aware of the infection only when the number
of infected nodes exceeds a given threshold, and only then it makes an observation of the infection status
of the nodes. (The problem becomes trivial if the network administrator is constantly monitoring all the
nodes in the network.) For example, a perpetrator who aims to manipulate the stock price of a company
may start to spread a false rumor about the company on a social network. The regulatory authority do not
have enough resources to monitor the whole network all the time and for all possible events. Therefore, it
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4becomes aware of the false rumor only when the number of infected nodes becomes sufficiently large. Our
work can also be applied to the case where the source has an estimate of when the network administrator
discovers the infection. This can be the case in the previous stock price manipulation example when the
perpetrator first spreads a rumor within his social network using private messages to collude with other
users, and then all colluding users post the rumor publicly on the stock’s initial public offering day in
order to manipulate its price and profit from it.
Our main contributions are the following:
(i) We formulate a strategic game in which the network administrator and infection source are the
players. The network administrator uses a source estimator in which it can probe any nodes within
a given radius of a randomly chosen Jordan center of the observed infection graph. A larger probe
or estimation radius ensures that the source can be identified but incurs a higher cost. The infection
source uses an infection strategy in which the rate of infection over each edge in the network can
be controlled in order to achieve a minimum safety margin to the Jordan centers. The source is
rewarded for each infected node, and penalized if it is identified by the network administrator.
(ii) Given a safety margin for the infection source, we show that the best-response strategy for the
network administrator is to use the Jordan centers as the source estimator or adopt an estimation
radius equal to the safety margin. We derive conditions under which each of these strategies are
optimal.
(iii) Given an estimation radius for the network administrator, we show that the optimal safety margin
for the infection source when the underlying network is a tree, is either zero or one more than the
estimation radius. We derive an infection strategy, called the Dominant Infection Strategy (DIS),
which maximizes the number of infected nodes subject to a given safety margin.
(iv) We derive conditions under which a Nash equilibrium for the strategic game in (i) exists. We show
that when a Nash equilibrium exists, the best response for the network administrator is to adopt the
Jordan center estimator. This gives a game-theoretic interpretation to the Jordan center estimator,
in addition to being a universally robust estimator (which we showed previously in [19]).
Our problem of finding the best-response infection strategy is related to the influence maximization
problem, which aims to find a subset of influential nodes to maximize the expected number of nodes
that are “influenced” or infected by the chosen subset [27], [28], and is shown by [29] to be a NP-hard
optimization problem. Approximate solutions have been extensively investigated by various researchers
[30]–[32]. The main difference between our work and the influence maximization problem is that the
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5source node in our problem is fixed, and we seek an infection strategy, given any source node, to maximize
the set of infected nodes, subject to a safety margin to the Jordan center of the infection graph.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the system model, assumptions
and provide a game-theoretic problem formulation. In Section III, we show the best-response estimation
strategy for the network administrator given any infection strategy. In Section IV, we propose a best-
response infection strategy for the source given any estimation strategy. In Section V, we derive conditions
under which a Nash equilibrium of the strategic game exists. We present simulation results in Section VI
to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed strategies on various synthetic and real networks. Finally
we conclude and summarize in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first describe our system model and assumptions, and then we provide a game-
theoretic problem formulation for the infection spreading and source identification.
Consider an undirected graph G(V,E) representing a social network, where V is the set of vertices
or nodes, and E is the set of edges. Because of technical difficulties, our analysis and strategy design
assume that G is a tree, as is commonly done in the literature [14]–[18], [26]. We will however apply
our strategies heuristically to general networks in our simulations in Section VI.
We assume that there is a single source node v∗ ∈ V at time 0. An infection can pass from one node
to another. For example in the case of an online social network, a user may post a rumor he sees in the
posting of his friend using his own account. An infected node remains infected throughout, and has the
capability of infecting its neighbors at a deterministic rate. For any edge (i, j) ∈ E, we let µ(i, j) to be
the time it takes for an infected node i to infect its susceptible neighbor j, which we call the infection
time associated with the edge (i, j). Let λ(i, j) = 1/µ(i, j) be the infection rate of (i, j). For any pair
of nodes v and u in G, let d(v, u) be the number of hops in the shortest path between v and u, which is
also called the distance between v and u. For any edge (i, j) with d(v∗, i) = m and d(v∗, j) = m+1, we
assume λ(i, j) is uniformly upper bounded by a maximum infection rate λ¯m > 0. In examples like rumor
spreading, λ¯m is non-increasing in m as it becomes more difficult for an infected node further away from
the source to infect another susceptible node. We assume that the network administrator observes one
snapshot of all the infected nodes in the network, and tries to estimate the source at the time tobs when
the number of infected nodes first exceeds a threshold nobs > 1. We call tobs the observation time, and
nobs the observation threshold.
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6For any time t > 0, let
d¯(t) = max
{
k :
k−1∑
m=0
λ¯−1m ≤ t
}
. (1)
Since the infection rate of each edge is upper bounded by its respective λ¯m, the maximum number of
hops the infection can spread from the source in time t is d¯(t). We assume that the graph is sufficiently
large so that d¯(tobs) ≤ d¯(v∗, V ), i.e., the network administrator observes the infection graph before the
infection can spread to all nodes in the network.
For any pair of nodes v and u in G, let ρ(v, u) to be the shortest path from v to u, and the infection
time of ρ(v, u) to be
µ(v, u) =
∑
(i,j)∈ρ(v,u)
µ(i, j)
=
∑
(i,j)∈ρ(v,u)
1
λ(i, j)
. (2)
The collection of infection rates Λ = {λ(i, j) : (i, j) ∈ E} is called an infection strategy for the source
node. Given any infection strategy Λ, we denote the set of infected nodes at time tobs as
VI = {u ∈ G : µ(v
∗, u) ≤ tobs}. (3)
We sometimes use VI(Λ) instead of VI to indicate that the given set of infected nodes resulted from the
infection strategy Λ. Let GI to be the minimum connected subgraph of G that spans VI, which we call
the infection graph at time tobs.
Throughout this paper, we let |X| denote the expected number of nodes in the random set X conditioned
on the infection graph, and 1A denote an indicator function with value 1 iff the clause A is true.
A. Network Administrator
At the observation time tobs, the network administrator observes the infection graph GI, and tries to
estimate the infection source. Although nobs is known to the network administrator, since it does not
know the starting time that the source begins its infection spreading, it does not know the amount of
elapsed time tobs. We assume that the network administrator can choose a subset of nodes to investigate,
which we call the suspect set. It is important for the network administrator to decide which subset of
nodes to investigate in order to minimize the cost and maximize its chance of identifying the infection
source. In the same spirit as [14]–[18], the network administrator is assumed to have limited knowledge
of the underlying infection spreading process, and its estimation strategy can only depend on the observed
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7infection graph GI. In the following, we present the definition of the Jordan center and then introduce a
class of estimation strategies based on the Jordan center.
Given any set A ⊂ V , denote the largest distance between v and any node u ∈ A to be
d¯(v,A) = max
u∈A
d(v, u).
For any infection strategy Λ, we call the largest distance d¯(v, VI) between v and any infected node the
infection range of v. We let
JC = {v : d¯(v, VI) = min
u∈G
d¯(u, VI)}, (4)
to be the set of nodes with minimum infection range, which are known as the Jordan centers of GI [33].
It is shown in [17] that if G is a tree, then |JC| ≤ 2.
When no prior knowledge of the infection source is available, any node in VI is equally likely to be
the source as infection rates over different edges can be heterogeneous. Therefore, a Jordan center is
a minimax source estimator that minimizes the largest distance to any infected node. It has also been
shown in [17]–[19] that the Jordan center is a robust source estimate. Another popular estimator is the ML
estimator. However, [26] shows that it is possible to design an infection strategy so that the probability of
the ML estimator being the true source is approximately 1/|VI|, i.e., all the infected nodes are considered
by the network administrator to be approximately equally likely to be the source. If tobs is large, then
the ML estimator performs badly. The Jordan center estimator does not have this problem since there are
at most two Jordan centers in any tree. As such, we assume that the network administrator chooses the
suspect set Vsp(da) to be the set of infected nodes within da ≥ 0 hops from an arbitrarily chosen Jordan
center u, i.e.,
Vsp(da) = {v ∈ VI : d(v, u) ≤ da}. (5)
We call da the estimation radius. Note that Vsp(da) depends only on the observed infection graph VI.
The strategy of the network administrator is denoted using da.
We let ds to be the distance between the actual source and the Jordan centers, i.e.,
ds(Λ) = min
u∈JC
d(v∗, u). (6)
We call ds(Λ) the safety margin of the source achieved by the infection strategy Λ.
If da ≥ ds(Λ), then the infection source is in the suspect set, and the network administrator has a
non-negative probability of identifying the source. The network administrator obtains an expected gain
ga(da, VI), which we assume to be non-increasing in da. For example, if the network administrator only
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8has access to the infection graph and has no additional prior information, its best strategy is to uniformly
choose a node from the set of suspects as the estimated source node. Its expected reward is then inversely
proportional to the number of nodes in Vsp(da). In another application, the network administrator may
have side information that allows it to always correctly identify the source node if it is included in the
suspect set. In this case, we let the expected reward to be ga(da, VI) = ga. Some positive cost ca(Vsp(da))
is incurred for probing nodes in Vsp(da). We assume that ca(Vsp(da)) is an increasing function of the
estimation radius da. We let the utility function of the network administrator be
ua(da,Λ) = −ca(Vsp(da)) + ga(da, VI)1da≥ds(Λ). (7)
The network administrator’s utility function depends on Λ only through its infection graph VI, which the
administrator observes at time tobs, and the safety margin ds(Λ). Although the network administrator’s
utility function depends on the safety margin of the source, it does not know a priori the safety margin
chosen by the source. In this paper we perform a game theoretic analysis of the estimation strategy used.
B. Infection Source
Suppose that the network administrator uses an estimation radius of da ≥ 0. We assume that the
observation time tobs is unknown to the infection source, but the source knows the infection threshold
nobs at which the network administrator will attempt to identify it. We show in Section IV that tobs can be
computed from nobs. For each node that is infected, the source is rewarded with a gain gs. A positive cost
cs(da) is incurred if it falls within the suspect set of the network administrator. We assume that cs(da)
is a non-decreasing function of the estimation radius da. The utility function of the source adopting the
infection strategy Λ is given by
us(da,Λ) = gs|VI| − cs(da)1da≥ds(Λ). (8)
C. Strategic Game
We model the infection spreading and source identification as a strategic game where the network
administrator and the infection source are the two players. The utility functions of the two players are
given in (7) and (8), respectively. Given any infection strategy Λ (or more specifically, the safety margin
ds(Λ)), the network administrator finds the best-response estimation strategy with estimation radius d∗a
that maximizes its utility function, i.e.,
d∗a = argmax
da
ua(da,Λ).
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9On the other hand, given any estimation radius da, the infection source finds the best-response infection
strategy Λ∗ that maximizes its utility function, i.e.,
Λ∗ = argmax
Λ
us(da,Λ).
If there exists a pair (d∗a,Λ∗) such that given Λ∗, the best-response estimation strategy has estimation
radius d∗a; and given d∗a, the best-response infection strategy is Λ∗, then (d∗a,Λ∗) is a Nash equilibrium
of the strategic game [34].
In Sections III and IV, we find the best-response estimation strategy and the best-response infection
strategy for the network administrator and the infection source, respectively. In Section V, we derive the
Nash equilibrium of the strategic game.
III. BEST-RESPONSE ESTIMATION STRATEGY FOR THE NETWORK ADMINISTRATOR
In this section, we derive the best-response estimation strategy for the network administrator. In this
paper, we assume that the network administrator utilizes the Jordan center based estimation strategy,
which is characterized by the estimation radius da. Given the infection strategy Λ with safety margin
ds(Λ) = ds, the network administrator chooses an optimal estimation radius to maximize its utility
function.
We first consider the case where ds = 0. In this case, the inequality da ≥ ds always holds. From (7),
the network administrator’s utility function becomes
ua(da,Λ) = −ca(Vsp(da)) + ga(da, VI),
which is decreasing in da. Therefore, the optimal estimation radius is given by da = 0.
Now suppose that ds > 0. We claim that the estimation radius of a best-response estimation strategy
is either 0 or ds. To prove this claim, it suffices to show the following inequalities:
ua(0,Λ) > ua(d
′
a,Λ), ∀ d
′
a ∈ (0, ds); (9)
ua(ds,Λ) > ua(d
′
a,Λ), ∀ d
′
a ≥ ds + 1. (10)
We first show the inequality (9). Since 0 < d′a < ds, the gains for both the estimation strategy
with da = 0 and the estimation strategy with da = d′a are 0. The inequality (9) then holds because
ca(Vsp(0)) < ca(Vsp(d
′
a)). We next show the inequality (10). The inequality da ≥ ds holds for both the
estimation strategy with da = ds and the estimation strategy with da = d′a ≥ ds+1. Since ca(Vsp(ds)) <
ca(Vsp(d
′
a)) and ga(ds, VI) ≥ ga(d′a, VI), the inequality (10) holds. This completes the proof of the claim.
The following theorem then follows immediately.
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Theorem 1. Suppose that the infection source adopts the infection strategy Λ with safety margin ds(Λ) =
ds. If ds = 0, the estimation radius d∗a of the best-response estimation strategy is 0. If ds > 0, the
estimation radius of the best-response estimation strategy is given by
d∗a =


0, if ga(ds, VI) < ca(Vsp(ds))− ca(Vsp(0)),
ds, if ga(ds, VI) > ca(Vsp(ds))− ca(Vsp(0)),
0 or ds, if ga(ds, VI) = ca(Vsp(ds))− ca(Vsp(0)).
(11)
We remind the reader that the quantities ga(ds, VI) and Vsp(ds) in Theorem 1 depend on the infection
strategy Λ only through the infection graph VI observed by the network administrator. Therefore, given
the safety margin ds, the network administrator can formulate its best response using Theorem 1 without
knowing the source utility function.
We observe that if ds > 0 in Theorem 1, then using an estimation radius of d∗a = 0 implies that
the network administrator has zero probability of identifying the infection source. This happens when
the reward of catching the infection source is significantly lower than the cost of probing more nodes.
In practical systems, attempts should be made to keep the cost of probing each node in the network
sufficiently small so that the infection source can be identified with positive probability. On the other
hand, our result also points to the intuitive conclusion that for a source to escape identification with
probability one, the infection observation time tobs must be sufficiently long (cf. Theorem 2), and the
source’s safety margin must be chosen to be sufficiently large so that ca(Vsp(ds)) − ca(Vsp(0)) is large
and the first case in (11) holds.
IV. BEST-RESPONSE INFECTION STRATEGY FOR THE INFECTION SOURCE IN A TREE
In this section, we derive a best-response infection strategy for the infection source for the case where
the underlying graph G is a tree. We assume that the infection source knows the observation threshold
nobs but not the observation time tobs. We first derive our infection strategy based on the observation time
tobs, and show how to compute tobs from nobs.
Given an estimation radius da and an observation time t, the source designs a best-response infection
strategy that maximizes its utility function. We first introduce the notion of a maximum infection strategy.
Let ‖Λ‖ denote the infection size of the infection strategy Λ.
Definition 1. Given any safety margin ds and observation time t, we define the maximum infection
strategy with safety margin ds to be the infection strategy that maximizes the number of infected nodes at
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time t among all infection strategies that achieve the safety margin ds. Let the set of maximum infection
strategies with safety margin ds be M(ds, t).
For each estimation radius da, we design a best-response infection strategy Λ∗ for the infection source
in three steps:
• Step 1: Given any safety margin ds and any observation time t, we find a maximum infection strategy
Λds,t ∈ M(ds, t).
• Step 2: We search for the smallest t such that ‖Λds,t‖ ≥ nobs, and set tobs = t.
• Step 3: Among all maximum infection strategies found in Step 2, we find one that maximizes the
source’s utility function as the best-response infection strategy, i.e., an infection strategy Λ∗ = Λd∗s ,tobs
where
d∗s = argmax
ds
us(da,Λds,tobs).
Note that under a given safety margin constraint ds and observation time t, the source’s utility us(·, ·)
is invariant to which infection strategy is chosen from M(ds, t). In the following, we first determine the
range of values that the safety margin ds can take for given set of maximum infection rates {λ¯m}, and
observation time t, i.e., those values of ds such that M(ds, t) 6= ∅. We call such a safety margin feasible.
It is clear that M(0, t) = {Λmax}, where Λmax is the infection strategy in which each node at distance
m from the source is infected at its respective maximum rate λ¯m−1. We next propose an algorithm to
find an infection strategy in M(ds, t), for all feasible ds > 0.
A. Maximum Infection Strategy with Safety Margin Constraint
Given any observation time t, it turns out that not all values of ds are feasible. To see this, consider an
infection spreading along a linear network. Since the maximum number of hops the infection can spread
from the source is d¯(t) (cf. (1)), the safety margin cannot be more than ⌊d¯(t)/2⌋. The following theorem
provides the achievable upper bound for the safety margin in a tree. The proof is in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. Suppose the underlying graph G is a tree. For any given observation time t, the largest
feasible safety margin is
d¯s =
⌊
d¯(t)
2
⌋
. (12)
From Theorem 2, we see that the safety margin of any infection strategy can take values only from the
set [0, d¯s]. Given a feasible safety margin ds, we next show how to design a maximum infection strategy
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Λds,t ∈ M(ds, t). In the rest of this section, we adopt the following notations: Let GI,t be the infection
graph at observation time t generated by a given infection strategy, which will be clear from the context.
Let Tu to be the subtree of GI,t rooted at node u with the first link in the path from u to the source node
v∗ removed. Let lu to be a leaf node in Tu that has maximum distance from u, i.e.,
lu ∈ {i ∈ Tu : d(u, i) = max
j∈Tu
d(u, j)}. (13)
We start by defining a dominant path and showing an elementary result related to this definition.
Definition 2. For any observation time t, a dominant path is a path between the source v∗ and any node
in the infection graph GI,t that has the maximum distance.
Lemma 1. Suppose that G is a tree. Consider a maximum infection strategy with a feasible safety margin
ds that results in an infection graph GI,t at time t. Then, the infection along each edge in any dominant
path of GI,t has maximum infection rate λ¯m if the endpoint of the edge closer to the source is at distance
m from it.
The proof of Lemma 1 is provided in Appendix B. To get a safety margin ds > 0, the intuition is to
construct one dominant path Pd starting at v∗ so that the Jordan center is biased towards the leaf node at the
other end of Pd, which in turn results in a safety margin ds. We discuss how to select an optimal dominant
path in Algorithm 1. For now, we assume that a dominant path Pd is given. Our proposed DIS(ds, t)
strategy, given in Strategy 1, is defined by a set of parameters, {λm : m ∈ [0, d¯(t) − 1]}. Consider any
infected node i on the path Pd. Suppose d(v∗, i) = m and let j be the susceptible neighboring node of
i on Pd. The node i infects j with rate λ¯m and infects all its other susceptible neighbors with rate λm.
On the other hand, for any infected node that is not on Pd, it infects all its susceptible neighbors with
the same rate that it itself was previously infected.
In the following discussion, we show that if the parameter λm is set to be that in (22), and the dominant
path is selected by Algorithm 1, then DIS(ds, t) ∈ M(ds, t).
Suppose that v∗ has k neighbors v1, v2, · · · , vk in GI, where k ≥ 2. Without loss of generality,
suppose that the labels are assigned so that d(v, lv1) ≥ d(v, lv2 ) ≥ . . . ≥ d(v, lvk ). We have the following
elementary result, the proof of which is provided in Appendix C.
Lemma 2. Suppose that G is a tree. Given an infection graph GI,t, if d(v∗, lv1) > d(v∗, lv2), then at
least one end of any diameter of GI,t is in the subtree Tv1 .
We now show how to find the optimal parameter λm in DIS(ds, t) so that it achieves a safety margin
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Strategy 1 Dominant Infection Strategy DIS(ds, t)
1: Inputs: G = (V,E), source v∗, observation time t, required safety margin ds, set of maximum
infection rates {λ¯m}, infection rates {λm,j} given in (22), and a dominant path Pd found by Algorithm
1 below.
2: Output: λ(u, v), the infection rate for every (u, v) ∈ GI,t.
3: for each u ∈ V do
4: if u ∈ Pd then
5: Let m = d(v∗, i).
6: If v is the susceptible neighbor of u on Pd, set λ(u, v) = λ¯m.
7: For any other susceptible neighbor v of u not on Pd, set λ(u, v) = λDISm,j where j = d(u, v), and
pass the message (m, 1) to v.
8: else
9: Let (au, bu) be the message received by u. For any susceptible neighbor v of u, set λ(u, v) =
λDISau,bu . Pass the message (au, bu + 1) to v.
10: end if
11: end for
12: return {λ(u, v) : (u, v) ∈ GI,t}
PSfrag replacements
T˜ud(v∗,lv1 )−1
T˜um T˜u0
u0
um
ud¯(t)
v∗
lv1
Fig. 1. Illustration of the infection graph GI.
ds. From Lemma 1, we have
d(v∗, lv1) = d¯(t). (14)
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Let lv1 be a leaf node so that ρ(v∗, lv1) = (u0 = v∗, u1, · · · , ud¯(t) = lv1) is the given dominant path Pd.
For 0 ≤ m ≤ d(v∗, lv1)− 1, define T˜um to be Tum\Tum+1 . Similar to the definition in (13), let l˜um be a
leaf node in T˜um that has maximum distance from um. Figure 1 shows an illustration of GI,t and T˜um .
For each m ≥ 1, let
tm =
m−1∑
k=0
λ¯−1k (15)
be the time taken to infect node um. Suppose the nodes in ρ(um, l˜um) are infected at an average rate
λm with
d(um, l˜um) = ⌊λm(t− tm)⌋ . (16)
Let D(um) to be the set of longest paths such that one end of any path D(um) ∈ D(um) is lv1 and
the other end is in T˜um . From (14) and (16), the number of vertices in D(um) is
|D(um)| = d(lv1 , um) + d(um, l˜um) + 1
= d(v∗, lv1)− d(v
∗, um) + d(um, l˜um) + 1
= d¯(t)−m+ ⌊λm(t− tm)⌋+ 1. (17)
Let vˆ(um) to be a node in the middle of D(um), i.e., vˆ(um) ∈ argminv∈D(um) d¯(v,D(um)). Since the
infection is propagated at the maximum rates along Pd, we can always choose vˆ(um) ∈ Pd with
d(v∗, vˆ(um))
= d(v∗, lv1)− d(vˆ(um), lv1)
= d(v∗, lv1)−
(⌈
|D(um)|
2
⌉
− 1
)
. (18)
In order to maximize the number of infected nodes, we maximize |D(um)|. Note that |D(um)| is odd,
because otherwise we can always increase λm so that we have one more node in |D(um)|, but (18)
remains the same. Then we have
d(v∗, vˆ(um))
= d(v∗, lv1)−
(
|D(um)|
2
+
1
2
− 1
)
=
1
2
(
d¯(t) +m− ⌊λm(t− tm)⌋
)
. (19)
Since ds > 0, we must have d(v∗, lv1) > d(v∗, lv2). From Lemma 2, we see that one end of any
diameter is a lv1 . Then any diameter is in the set of paths
⋃d¯(t)−1
m=0 D(um) and the set of Jordan centers
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is a subset of {vˆ(um) : D(um) ∈
⋃d¯(t)−1
m=0 D(um)}. The safety margin requirement ds is satisfied if the
right hand side of (19) has value at least ds for every m ∈ [0, ds], i.e.,
⌊λm(t− tm)⌋ ≤ hm , d¯(t)− 2ds +m. (20)
To maximize the number of infected nodes at time t, we choose each λm to be as large as possible.
Therefore, for m ∈ [0, ds], we choose λm to be the largest value so that equality holds in (20), i.e.,
λm =
hm
t− tm
. (21)
We then find δt,m ≥ 0 for j ∈ [0, hm] such that∑
j∈Am
(
λ¯m+j − δt,m
)−1
= t− tm −
∑
j /∈Am
λ¯−1m+j ,
where Am = {j ≤ hm : λ¯m+j > λm}. Such a δt,m exists because hm ≤ d¯(t) −m, the longest distance
the infection can propagate from um. Finally, we let the infection at each node v ∈ T˜um such that
d(um, v) = j ≤ hm spread at rate λ¯m+j − δt,m. If m ∈ (ds, d¯(t)), we choose λ¯m+j to be the spreading
rate for all v ∈ T˜um such that d(um, v) = j. Note that with this choice, vˆ(um) is the Jordan center on
Pd for all m ∈ [0, ds].
In summary, for a v ∈ T˜um such that d(um, v) = j, we let it infect its susceptible neighbors not on
the dominant path with rate
λDISm,j =


λ¯m+j − δt,m, if j ∈ Am, and 0 ≤ m ≤ ds,
λ¯m+j , otherwise.
(22)
We have the following result. The proof is provided in Appendix D.
Lemma 3. Suppose that DIS(ds, t) with safety margin ds > 0 has the dominant path Pd. Then, it
maximizes the number of infected nodes at time t amongst all infection strategies with safety margin ds
and dominant path Pd.
In the following, we show how to find the optimal dominant path. Given any dominant path Pd =
(u0 = v
∗, . . . , ud¯(t)) as an input of DIS(ds, t) with safety margin ds > 0, we have from (22), that the
number of infected nodes is given by
d¯(t) +
d¯(t)−1∑
m=0
|T˜um |. (23)
To find an optimal dominant path so that the above sum is maximized, we use the procedure in
Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Bellman-Ford Dominant Path Finding
1: Perform a breadth-first search starting at v∗, and for each edge (u,w) where d(v∗, w) = d(v∗, u)+1 ≤
d¯(t), assign the following weight:
w(u,w) = |{v ∈ Tu\Tw : d(v, u) ≤ h(u)}| ,
with
h(u) =


d¯(t)− 2ds + d(v
∗, u), if d(v∗, u) ≤ ds,
d¯(t)− d(v∗, u), otherwise.
2: Use the Bellman-Ford algorithm [35] to find a maximal weighted path (u0, . . . , ud¯(t)) starting at
u0 = v
∗
. The maximal weighted path is output as the dominant path, and its weight added to d¯(t)
is output as ‖DIS(ds, t)‖.
In Algorithm 1, since the weight we have assigned to each edge (um, um+1) in the maximal weight
path found corresponds exactly to |T˜um | in (23), the algorithm gives us the optimal dominant path. In the
first step of Algorithm 1, the weights w(u,w) for all neighbors w of u in Tu can be found by performing
another breadth-first search in the tree Tu. The time complexity of the first step is thus O(n2),1 where
n is the number of vertices within a distance d¯(t) of v∗ [35]. The Bellman-Ford algorithm in the second
step also has time complexity O(n2). Therefore, the overall time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n2).
Lemma 3 and Algorithm 1 then lead to the following result.
Theorem 3. Suppose G is a tree. For any observation time t and feasible safety margin ds, DIS(ds, t) ∈
M(ds, t) if the dominant path is found by Algorithm 1.
Since ‖DIS(ds, t)‖ is non-decreasing in t, we can now perform a binary search procedure in Algorithm 2
to determine the smallest t such that ‖DIS(ds, t)‖ ≥ nobs. Note that it suffices to perform the binary
search over the times {tm : m ≥ 1} defined in (15), because for any t ∈ [tm, tm+1), m ≥ 1, we have
‖DIS(ds, t)‖ = ‖DIS(ds, tm)‖ as the right hand side of (20) remains unchanged. Let
x0 = min{m : |{v : d(v
∗, v) ≤ d¯(tm)}| ≥ nobs}, (24)
y0 = min{m : |{v : d(v
∗, v) ≤ d¯(tm)− 2ds}| ≥ nobs}. (25)
1A function is said to be O(f(n)) if it is upper bounded by kf(n) for some constant k > 0 and for all n sufficiently large.
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We initialize the search to be over [tx0 , ty0 ]. Because not all vertices within distance d¯(tobs) are infected
by DIS(ds, tobs), while all nodes within distance d¯(tobs) − 2ds are infected, we have ‖DIS(ds, tx0)‖ ≤
nobs ≤ ‖DIS(ds, ty0)‖. The binary search takes at most O(log nobs) search steps. Assuming that the
tree G has bounded degree β, in each search step the computation of ‖DIS(ds, tm)‖ using Algorithm 1
takes at most O(β4dsn2obs) time complexity. Therefore the overall time complexity to find DIS(ds, tobs)
is O(β4dsn2obs log nobs).
Algorithm 2 Binary Search for tobs
1: Initialize x = x0 using (24), and y = y0 using (25).
2: while x < y − 1 do
3: Set m = ⌈(x+ y)/2⌉.
4: if ‖DIS(ds, tm)‖ ≤ nobs then
5: Set x = m.
6: else
7: Set y = m.
8: end if
9: end while
10: return Output tobs = ty .
B. Homogeneous Infection Rate Bounds
If λ¯m = λ¯ for all m ≥ 0, then d¯(t) = ⌊λ¯t⌋, and it can be shown from (22) that for all m and j,
λDISm,j = λ¯ ·min
{
1,
⌊λ¯t⌋ − 2ds +m
λ¯t−m
}
, (26)
i.e., the same rate is used to infect the vertices in the subtree T˜um . In this case, the DIS(ds, t) strategy
need not pass additional distance information along with the infection.
C. Infinite Regular Trees
In the following, we consider the special case where the underlying network is an infinite r-regular
tree, every node has r > 2 neighboring nodes, and λ¯m = 1 for all m ≥ 0. The fastest infection strategy
Λmax is the one that sets all infection rates to be the upper bound 1. Then the number of nodes infected
by the fastest infection strategy by time t can be shown to be given by
|VI(Λmax)| =
r(r − 1)t − 2
r − 2
.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the set of infected nodes by DIS and AD, where JC denotes the Jordan center of the set of infected nodes
at time t. The set of infected nodes by DIS are all the nodes within the circle with radius t−ds, while the set of infected nodes
by AD are all the nodes within the circle with radius ⌊t/2⌋. Since ds is upper bounded by ⌊t/2⌋, we have t− ds ≥ ⌊t/2⌋.
This infection strategy has safety margin 0. Now suppose that the source wishes to achieve a safety
margin ds ≤ d¯s in (12), the set of infected nodes by time t by our proposed DIS(ds, t) strategy can be
shown to be all nodes with distance not greater than t− ds from the Jordan center as shown in Fig. 2.
Then, the number of nodes infected by time t is
|VI(DIS(ds, t))| =
r(r − 1)t−ds − 2
r − 2
.
When ds increases, the radius t − ds decreases, and the number of nodes infected by the maximum
infection strategy decreases. This is the necessary trade-off between the faster infection spreading speed
and the larger safety margin of the source.
The paper [26] proposes a messaging protocol called adaptive diffusion (AD) under the assumption that
the network administrator utilizes a ML estimation strategy. AD is a stochastic infection strategy, where its
safety margin falls in the range [1, ⌊t/2⌋] with probability one. Given any safety margin ds ∈ [1, ⌊t/2⌋],
with probability one, the set of infected nodes by time t by AD can be shown to be all nodes with
distance not greater than ⌊t/2⌋ from the Jordan center as shown in Fig. 2. Then, the number of nodes
|VI(AD)| infected by AD by time t satisfies the following bound with probability one:
|VI(AD)| ≤
r(r − 1)t−⌊t/2⌋ − 2
r − 2
≤ |VI(DIS(ds, t))|.
Therefore, our proposed DIS strategy infects at least as many nodes as the AD strategy almost surely.
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D. Best-response Infection Strategy for the Infection Source
Theorem 3 shows how to find a maximum infection strategy for a feasible ds. We next identify one
that maximizes the utility function of the infection source. We first present the following relationship
between maximum infection strategies of different safety margins.
Lemma 4. Suppose G is a tree. For any two safety margins ds and d′s, where 0 ≤ ds < d′s ≤ d¯s, any
strategy Λds ∈ M(ds, tobs) infects more nodes than any strategy Λd′s ∈ M(d′s, tobs), i.e., |VI(Λds)| >
|VI(Λd′s)|.
Proof: From (21), the average infection rate λm is a non-increasing function of the safety margin.
Since ds < d′s, the infection rate λm in Λds is larger than or equal to that in Λd′s for any 0 ≤ m ≤ d¯(t)−1.
However, equality does not hold for all m, because otherwise, Λds and Λd′s lead to the same infection
graph, which in turn implies that ds = d′s, a contradiction. As a result, we have |VI(Λds)| > |VI(Λd′s)|,
which completes the proof of Lemma 4.
We now derive the best-response infection strategy based on Lemma 4. Let Λds ∈ M(ds, tobs) be any
maximum infection strategy.
Assume that the network administrator uses the estimation radius da. We first consider the case where
da ≥ d¯s. Since no infection strategies have safety margins greater than d¯s, the inequality da ≥ ds always
holds. As a result, the cost cs(da) is always incurred. Therefore, to maximize its utility function, the
infection source maximizes its reward gs|VI| by maximizing the number of infected nodes |VI|. Lemma
4 then leads to the conclusion that Λ0 = Λmax is a best-response infection strategy.
Next, consider the case where da < d¯s. We claim that a best-response infection strategy is either Λ0
or Λda+1. Following Theorem 3, it suffices to prove the claim by showing the following inequalities:
us(da,Λ0) > us(da,Λd′s), ∀ d
′
s ∈ (0, da]; (27)
us(da,Λda+1) > us(da,Λd′s), ∀ d
′
s ∈ (da + 1, d¯s]. (28)
We first show the inequality (27). When 0 < d′s ≤ da, the source incurs a cost of cs(da) for both
Λ0 and Λd′s . In addition, from Lemma 4, we have |VI(Λ0)| > |VI(Λd′s)|, which in turn shows that the
inequality (27) holds. We next show the inequality (28). When da + 1 < d′s ≤ d¯s, the source does not
incur a cost for both Λda+1 and Λd′s . From Lemma 4, we have |VI(Λda+1)| > |VI(Λd′s)|, which shows that
the inequality (28) holds. This completes the proof for the claim. The following theorem now follows
immediately.
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Theorem 4. Suppose that G is a tree. Then, for any estimation radius da ≥ 0, a best-response infection
strategy for the infection source is given by
Λ∗ =


Λ0, if cs(da) < gs(|VI(Λ0)| − |VI(Λda+1)|),
Λda+1, if cs(da) > gs(|VI(Λ0)| − |VI(Λda+1)|),
Λ0 or Λda+1, if cs(da) = gs(|VI(Λ0)| − |VI(Λda+1)|),
where Λd ∈M(d, tobs) for all d ≥ 0.
V. NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN A TREE
In this section, we derive conditions under which a Nash equilibrium for the strategic game played
by the network administrator and the infection source exists. We also derive explicitly their respective
strategies at these Nash equilibria.
Theorem 5. Suppose G is a tree, and d¯s in (12) is greater than 0. Then, the strategic game of infection
spreading and source identification (7)-(8) has the following properties:
(a) Let Λ0 ∈ M(0, tobs). The strategy pair (0,Λ0) is a Nash equilibrium iff us(0,Λ1) ≤ us(0,Λ0), i.e.,
cs(0) ≤ gs (|VI(Λ0)| − |VI(Λ1)|) for any Λ1 ∈ M(1, tobs).
(b) For each Λ1 ∈ M(1, tobs), the strategy pair (0,Λ1) is a Nash equilibrium iff us(0,Λ0) ≤ us(0,Λ1)
and ua(1,Λ1) ≤ ua(0,Λ1), i.e., cs(0) ≥ gs (|VI(Λ0)| − |VI(Λ1)|) and ga(1, VI(Λ1)) ≤ ca(Vsp(1)) −
ca(Vsp(0)).
(c) No other pure strategy Nash equilibria exist.
Furthermore, if ga(da, VI(Λ)) = ga(da) is non-increasing in da for all infection strategies Λ, and
ca(Vsp(da)) = ca(da) is non-decreasing in da for all infection strategies Λ, then the sum utility of
the two players is maximized at the strategy pairs (0,Λ0) or (0,Λ1) for all Λ1 ∈ M(1, tobs).
The proof of Theorem 5 is provided in Appendix E. From Theorem 5, when a Nash equilibrium exists,
whether a infection source is identified with positive probability or not depends on the relative gains and
costs of the two players. It is interesting to note that if a Nash equilibrium exists, then the strategy of the
network administrator in equilibrium has da = 0, which corresponds to the Jordan center estimator. This
shows that under the technical conditions given in Theorem 5, the natural infection source estimator to
use is the Jordan center estimator, instead of probing a neighborhood set of the Jordan centers.
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VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results to evaluate the performance of our proposed infection and
estimation strategies. We first compare DIS with AD, and then show the behavior of the best-response
infection and estimation strategies under different gains and costs. For simplicity, our simulations are
performed assuming that ga(·, ·) = ga, ca(Vsp(da)) = ca|Vsp(da)|, and cs(da) = cs.
A. Extension to General Networks
Although the paths along which the infection spreads from the source node forms a tree that is a
subgraph of the given graph G, finding the best underlying tree over which to perform the infection
spreading is a NP-hard problem (similar to the procedure used in Algorithm 1, this is equivalent to the
longest path problem in a weighted graph, which is known to be NP-hard [35]). To adapt our proposed
DIS strategy for general networks, we adopt a heuristic: we first find a breadth-first search tree rooted at
the infection source and then apply the DIS strategy on this tree. In the following, we show simulation
results to verify the performance of the DIS strategy in general networks.
B. Number of Infected Nodes
We first evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed DIS algorithm in infecting nodes. We perform
simulations on four kinds of networks: random trees where each node has a degree uniformly drawn
from the set {2, 3}, scale-free networks [36] with 5000 nodes, the western states power grid network of
the United States [37] containing 4941 nodes, and a part of the Facebook network with 4039 nodes [38].
The benchmark we compare against is the AD infection strategy proposed in [26], where AD is shown
to be order-optimal for the source for infinite regular trees (with heuristic extensions to more general
networks). We let t to be even and λ¯m = 1 for m ≥ 0 in the simulations in order not to conflate the effect
of the rate bounds with the other factors. Given any observation time tobs, the safety margin ds(AD)
resulting from the AD falls in the range [1, tobs/2] with probability one, and the set of infected nodes at
time tobs is
VI(AD) = {u ∈ G : d(v˜, u) ≤ tobs/2},
where v˜ is picked uniformly at random from the set of nodes in G with distance ds(AD) from the
infection source v∗.
We let the observation time tobs to be 14, 14, 6 and 6 for random trees, the power grid network, scale-
free networks and the Facebook network, respectively. The observation times for scale-free networks and
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Fig. 3. Average numbers of infected nodes for DIS and AD for different networks.
the Facebook network are chosen to be relatively small because these networks are highly connected and
the average distances between each pair of nodes in the scale-free network and the Facebook network
are only 4.6 and 5.5 hops, respectively. The safety margin requirement ds is set to be 1, 2, . . . , tobs/2,
respectively. We run 1000 simulation runs for each kind of network and each value of ds. Fig. 3 shows
the average number of infected nodes for both DIS and AD. As expected, we see that there is a trade off
for DIS between the number of infected nodes and the safety margin. We also see that DIS consistently
infects more nodes than AD.
C. Best-response Infection Strategy
We then evaluate the proposed best-response infection strategy on random trees and the Facebook
network. The observation time tobs for each network is chosen as in Section VI-B. For each value of
da ∈ [0, d¯s], where d¯s = tobs/2, the best-response infection strategy is given by Theorem 4. We fix the
gain gs for all cases and vary the cost cs to make it low, medium and high, compared to gs. Specifically,
we set cs to be 400gs, 1200gs and 2000gs for random trees, and 50gs, 500gs and 1500gs for Facebook
network. Let DISds denote the DIS strategy with safety margin constraint ds. We run 1000 simulation
runs for each setting and plot the average utility of the best-response infection strategies for the infection
source in Fig. 4. We observe similar trends from Fig. 4 for both random trees and the Facebook network,
even though the DIS strategy was derived for tree networks.
• When the cost cs is low compared to the gain gs, the infection source always chooses DIS(0, tobs)
as its infection strategy. As a result, the infection source is identified by the network administrator.
However, it maximizes its reward by infecting the most number of nodes.
• When the cost cs is high compared to the gain gs, the infection source chooses DIS(da+1, tobs) for
da < d¯s to ensure that the network administrator does not identify it, and chooses DIS(0, tobs) for
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Fig. 4. Average utility of the best-response infection strategies for the infection source. When cs is low, DIS(0, tobs) is the
best-response infection strategy for all da. When cs is high, DIS(da + 1, tobs) are the best-response infection strategies for
da < d¯s, and DIS(0, tobs) is the best-response infection strategy for da = d¯s. When cs is medium, DIS(da + 1, tobs) are the
best-response infection strategies for da ≤ 2 for random trees and da ≤ 1 for Facebook network, respectively, and DIS(0, tobs)
is the best-response infection strategy for other values of da.
da = d¯s as it can not find any infection strategy with a safety margin greater than d¯s (cf. Theorem
2).
• When the cost cs is medium compared to the gain gs, the infection source chooses DIS(da+1, tobs)
when da is small. As da increases, the infection source switches to DIS(0, tobs) as its infection
strategy.
D. Best-response Estimation Strategy
Lastly, we evaluate the proposed best-response estimation strategy on random trees and Facebook
network. Given any infection strategy Λ with safety margin ds(Λ) = ds, where ds ∈ [1, d¯s] and d¯s =
tobs/2, the best-response estimation strategy is given by Theorem 1. We choose nobs so that it corresponds
to the same observation time tobs used for each network in Section VI-B. We fix the cost ca for all cases
and vary the gain ga to make it low, medium and high, compared to ca. Specifically, we set ga to be
ca, 50ca and 200ca for random trees, and ca, 500ca and 2000ca for Facebook network. We run 1000
simulation runs for each setting and plot the average utility of the best-response estimation strategies for
the network administrator in Fig. 5. We observe the following from Fig. 5.
• When the gain ga is low compared to the cost ca, the network administrator always chooses da to
be 0 to minimize the cost. As a result, the infection source gets caught only when ds = 0.
• When the gain ga is high compared to the cost ca, the network administrator always chooses da to
be ds. As a result, the overall cost increases with ds as more nodes need to be investigated, which
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Fig. 5. Average utility of the best-response estimation strategies for the network administrator. When ga is low, da is chosen
to be 0 for all ds. When ga is high, da is chosen to be ds for all ds. When ga is medium, da is set to be ds for ds ≤ 4 for
random trees and ds ≤ 1 for Facebook network, respectively, and da is set to be 0 for other values of ds.
in turn decreases the utility of the network administrator. Moreover, the infection source always gets
caught in this case.
• When the gain ga is medium compared to the cost ca, the network administrator chooses da to be ds
when ds is small and the gain of identifying the infection source is higher than the cost of investigat-
ing more nodes. When ds increases to a point that the increase in cost of investigating |Vsp(da)| − 1
more nodes exceeds the gain of identifying the infection source, the network administrator chooses
da to be 0.
E. Incomplete Observations
In this paper, we have assumed that the network administrator can observe all the infected nodes.
In this subsection, we evaluate the robustness of the Jordan center based estimation strategy and DIS
infection strategy when only a subset of the infected nodes are observed by the network administrator.
Let α be the percentage of infected nodes that are randomly observed by the network administrator,
and let JC(α) be the Jordan center of the set of observed infected nodes. Note that JC(α) may be different
from the Jordan center of all infected nodes JC. Therefore, the distance d(v∗, JC(α)) can differ from ds.
The network administrator can identify the infection source when d(v∗, JC(α)) ≤ da.
We perform simulations on random trees, scale-free networks, the power grid network and the Facebook
network. We set gs = 1 and cs to be 1200, 6000, 1600 and 3000 for random trees, scale-free networks,
the power grid network and the Facebook network, respectively. For the network administrator, we let the
gain ga to be medium compared to ca. Specifically, we set ca = 1 and ga to be 50, 1500, 200 and 500 for
random trees, scale-free networks, the power grid network and the Facebook network, respectively. The
October 15, 2018 DRAFT
25
8 565.0 73.7 -282.2 -540.4 -728.3 -869.4 -919.0 -714.7 -155.6 -195.2 -237.5 -262.4 -345.0 -466.6 -602.1 -771.5
7 565.0 73.7 -282.2 -540.4 -725.9 -847.8 -813.4 -448.3 22.0 -36.8 -96.7 -123.2 -207.4 -345.0 -469.3 -485.1
6 565.0 73.7 -279.8 -540.4 -717.5 -786.6 -562.6 -87.1 262.0 187.2 132.1 94.4 21.4 -106.6 -163.7 508.5
5 565.0 73.7 -278.6 -536.8 -687.5 -580.2 -51.4 88.1 556.4 486.4 440.9 377.6 311.0 235.8 733.9 647.7
4 565.0 74.9 -276.2 -508.0 -531.5 88.2 153.8 133.7 806.0 779.2 724.1 652.8 655.0 930.2 839.5 660.5 -1047.8 -1090.8 -1204.8 -2058.8 -10.9 -96.1 -359.9 -1075.6
3 566.2 78.5 -257.0 -403.6 288.1 281.4 204.2 143.3 1022.0 1011.2 962.5 916.8 1090.2 1000.6 849.1 663.7 -183.8 -244.8 -394.8 -1956.8 823.1 740.9 237.1 -892.6
2 566.2 94.1 -179.0 521.6 447.7 317.4 219.8 149.3 1145.2 1142.4 1108.1 1169.6 1112.6 1007.0 853.9 663.7 2756.2 2725.2 2527.2 3839.2 2035.1 1910.9 1188.1 1789.4
1 566.2 140.9 841.0 654.8 463.3 327.0 224.6 151.7 1207.6 1204.8 1216.9 1179.2 1117.4 1008.6 853.9 663.7 4622.2 4555.2 4465.2 3917.2 2674.1 2552.9 2514.1 1843.4
0 587.8 1235.3 915.4 659.6 468.1 328.2 225.8 151.7 1250.8 1251.2 1223.3 1182.4 1117.4 1008.6 853.9 663.7 4940.2 4891.2 4783.2 3935.2 2797.1 2735.9 2520.1 1843.4
8 553.0 68.1 -285.3 -542.2 -731.1 -871.2 -974.2 -1048.8 -302.8 -323.6 -341.5 -390.7 -472.6 -574.7 -746.6 -933.7
7 553.0 68.1 -285.3 -542.2 -731.1 -871.2 -974.2 -1047.6 -197.2 -230.8 -250.3 -323.5 -410.2 -550.7 -708.2 -919.3
6 553.0 68.1 -285.3 -542.2 -731.1 -871.2 -974.2 140.4 6.0 -35.6 -75.9 -160.3 -263.0 -432.3 -647.4 661.5
5 553.0 68.1 -285.3 -542.2 -729.9 -868.8 222.2 151.2 284.4 226.8 180.1 70.1 -53.4 -288.3 845.4 661.5
4 553.0 68.1 -285.3 -542.2 -728.7 328.8 225.8 151.2 524.4 473.2 424.9 302.1 159.4 991.7 845.4 661.5 -1051.1 -1108.9 -1237.6 -2063.6 -168.3 -222.0 -477.5 -1140.5
3 553.0 68.1 -285.3 -539.8 468.9 328.8 225.8 151.2 798.0 759.6 687.3 606.1 1093.8 991.7 845.4 661.5 -151.1 -136.9 -439.6 -2063.6 347.7 144.0 -357.5 -1113.5
2 553.0 68.1 -285.3 657.8 468.9 328.8 225.8 151.2 1007.6 991.6 914.5 1156.5 1093.8 991.7 845.4 661.5 2914.9 2725.1 1600.4 3936.4 1508.7 1044.0 137.5 1844.5
1 553.0 68.1 914.7 657.8 468.9 328.8 225.8 151.2 1142.0 1124.4 1196.1 1156.5 1093.8 991.7 845.4 661.5 4720.9 4657.1 4690.4 3936.4 2492.7 1935.0 2507.5 1844.5
0 553.0 1268.1 914.7 657.8 468.9 328.8 225.8 151.2 1198.0 1215.6 1196.1 1156.5 1093.8 991.7 845.4 661.5 4936.9 4885.1 4756.4 3936.4 2768.7 2730.0 2516.5 1844.5
8 530.4 54.3 -291.7 -544.1 -732.9 -872.7 -974.2 -1048.3 -319.8 -327.7 -356.1 -408.3 -483.3 -584.6 -742.6 -937.2
7 530.4 54.3 -291.7 -544.1 -732.9 -872.7 -974.2 -1048.3 -262.2 -270.1 -301.7 -369.9 -460.9 -575.0 -737.8 -934.0
6 530.4 54.3 -291.7 -544.1 -732.9 -872.7 -974.2 151.7 -87.8 -106.9 -156.1 -230.7 -364.9 -493.4 -712.2 662.8
5 530.4 54.3 -291.7 -544.1 -732.9 -872.7 225.8 151.7 126.6 126.7 66.3 -77.1 -228.9 -416.6 857.4 662.8
4 530.4 54.3 -291.7 -544.1 -732.9 327.3 225.8 151.7 419.4 368.3 298.3 158.1 -32.1 1010.6 857.4 662.8 -1053.2 -1094.2 -1187.6 -2006.3 -182.2 -254.2 -485.4 -1165.4
3 530.4 54.3 -291.7 -544.1 467.1 327.3 225.8 151.7 694.6 646.7 575.1 406.1 1111.9 1010.6 857.4 662.8 -555.2 -596.2 -803.6 -2006.3 63.8 -56.2 -437.4 -1162.4
2 530.4 54.3 -291.7 655.9 467.1 327.3 225.8 151.7 937.8 869.1 813.5 1177.3 1111.9 1010.6 857.4 662.8 2336.8 2277.8 426.4 3993.7 1122.8 489.8 -203.4 1834.6
1 530.4 54.3 908.3 655.9 467.1 327.3 225.8 151.7 1091.4 1051.5 1219.9 1177.3 1111.9 1010.6 857.4 662.8 4454.8 4413.8 4740.4 3993.7 2304.8 1434.8 2502.6 1834.6
0 530.4 1254.3 908.3 655.9 467.1 327.3 225.8 151.7 1179.4 1243.5 1219.9 1177.3 1111.9 1010.6 857.4 662.8 4934.8 4893.8 4812.4 3993.7 2721.8 2733.8 2514.6 1834.6
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Fig. 6. Average utility of the infection source for various observation percentage α. The color scale of the heat map is calibrated
for each kind of network respectively.
observation threshold nobs for each network is chosen to correspond to the same observation time tobs
used in Section VI-B. For each kind of network, we run 1000 simulations for each value of ds ∈ [0, d¯s],
da ∈ {0, 1, · · · , ds + 1} and α ∈ {1, 10, 50}, where d¯s = tobs/2. For each simulation run, we randomly
pick α percent of infected nodes as observed nodes, compute the realized utility values of the network
administrator and infection source, and average them over the simulation runs. In the realized utilities we
compute, the network administrator obtains a gain ga while the infection source incurs a cost cs, only
when d(v∗, JC(α)) ≤ da. The average utilities of the infection source and the network administrator are
shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, respectively.
Consider the utility of the infection source in Fig. 6. The best-response of the infection source is still
choosing ds to be either 0 or da + 1. This implies that the result of Theorem 4 is robust for the tested
networks even though only a subset of infected nodes can be observed.
Fig. 7 shows the utility of the network administrator. For random trees, the best-response of the network
administrator is still choosing da to be either 0 or ds, which verifies Theorem 1 in the case where only
partial observations are available. On the other hand, for general networks with incomplete observations
of the set of infected nodes, it becomes more difficult for the network administrator to correctly identify
the infection source. The network administrator needs to increase da in order to have a higher chance
of identifying the infection source. However, for dense networks, the cost of probing more nodes can
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8 -96.5 -110.4 -123.8 -137.2 -150.1 -156.3 -151.0 -122.4 -629.9 -625.6 -623.6 -628.5 -642.0 -666.8 -702.7 -727.2
7 -46.2 -55.1 -63.5 -71.8 -79.8 -86.2 -93.1 -95.4 -426.0 -418.8 -416.2 -420.7 -428.3 -443.0 -475.2 -520.0
6 -12.6 -18.1 -23.3 -28.1 -33.1 -39.8 -55.2 -73.0 -260.4 -251.4 -249.1 -251.8 -255.9 -264.3 -297.4 -422.8
5 9.8 6.5 3.4 0.9 -3.5 -17.4 -43.8 -49.7 -141.7 -134.2 -132.5 -131.0 -134.0 -144.0 -237.7 -263.1
4 24.8 22.9 21.2 19.1 10.3 -21.6 -29.7 -31.1 -64.9 -63.3 -60.1 -56.9 -66.6 -117.8 -131.0 -139.7 -3495.3 -3497.2 -3495.6 -3470.8 -2127.6 -2118.5 -2249.0 -2341.5
3 34.8 33.8 32.3 25.7 -9.8 -15.4 -17.4 -17.7 -25.2 -25.8 -23.3 -22.9 -53.0 -56.9 -59.1 -62.6 -3016.2 -3021.1 -3008.7 -2498.9 -1103.5 -1089.8 -1223.7 -1392.9
2 41.5 40.8 36.5 -3.0 -8.1 -8.9 -9.0 -9.1 -6.5 -8.0 -7.0 -20.0 -21.1 -22.0 -22.7 -23.7 -1252.6 -1265.8 -1240.8 -1438.3 -287.9 -270.2 -288.6 -624.6
1 45.9 42.5 -1.1 -3.5 -3.7 -3.8 -3.9 -3.9 0.7 -0.6 -5.5 -6.0 -6.4 -6.5 -6.6 -6.8 -228.5 -226.5 -230.3 -216.0 -26.7 -17.5 -57.0 -61.0
0 47.8 1.1 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.6 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.0
8 -99.2 -111.3 -124.2 -138.2 -151.5 -163.4 -174.7 -129.0 -541.4 -534.2 -540.8 -543.1 -566.2 -604.1 -655.8 -705.4
7 -47.7 -55.5 -63.7 -72.3 -80.4 -87.7 -94.7 -100.9 -354.4 -348.6 -353.4 -351.4 -365.5 -386.3 -424.9 -465.1
6 -13.4 -18.3 -23.3 -28.4 -33.0 -37.3 -41.4 -94.9 -207.0 -202.3 -203.0 -198.6 -202.9 -209.5 -223.4 -441.9
5 9.4 6.5 3.6 0.9 -1.6 -3.7 -56.2 -58.4 -103.8 -98.0 -97.0 -87.9 -84.0 -75.1 -244.0 -264.6
4 24.6 23.0 21.6 20.3 19.1 -32.0 -33.3 -34.4 -34.1 -29.8 -27.4 -16.3 -7.1 -127.1 -128.5 -139.7 -3489.9 -3487.9 -3465.9 -3459.2 -1832.0 -1876.1 -2119.3 -2323.6
3 34.8 34.0 33.5 33.0 -17.5 -18.0 -18.6 -19.0 -3.7 -0.6 5.3 11.0 -57.5 -59.1 -58.0 -62.5 -2907.0 -2919.7 -2736.2 -2436.4 -906.4 -913.6 -1087.5 -1354.4
2 41.5 41.4 41.4 -8.8 -9.1 -9.2 -9.4 -9.5 4.8 5.1 12.1 -22.7 -22.6 -22.9 -22.1 -23.4 -1158.7 -1121.1 -753.0 -1431.5 -214.1 -184.2 -163.8 -643.3
1 46.0 46.2 -3.8 -3.9 -3.9 -3.9 -4.0 -4.0 3.9 4.7 -6.8 -6.6 -6.6 -6.7 -6.5 -6.7 -178.0 -174.6 -193.3 -189.0 -5.9 65.1 -72.7 -64.7
0 49.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 2.6 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 3.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
8 -100.2 -112.0 -125.3 -139.1 -152.4 -165.8 -177.0 -130.1 -483.2 -486.1 -493.0 -499.2 -531.3 -594.0 -659.6 -708.6
7 -48.5 -56.0 -64.3 -72.8 -81.0 -89.2 -96.1 -101.9 -308.2 -310.7 -315.7 -318.3 -335.3 -376.4 -424.1 -463.3
6 -14.0 -18.7 -23.6 -28.6 -33.3 -38.1 -42.1 -96.0 -171.6 -172.0 -174.2 -173.4 -175.2 -195.5 -218.1 -440.6
5 8.9 6.3 3.5 0.8 -1.5 -4.2 -56.7 -58.9 -70.6 -72.7 -71.6 -61.3 -54.8 -54.1 -246.1 -263.3
4 24.3 22.9 21.6 20.4 19.4 -32.2 -33.5 -34.7 -13.6 -9.0 -5.5 5.6 19.8 -125.3 -129.2 -138.8 -3498.0 -3497.8 -3444.4 -3448.2 -1678.6 -1712.6 -2039.8 -2309.4
3 34.6 33.9 33.6 33.3 -17.4 -18.1 -18.7 -19.1 13.7 17.9 22.7 38.1 -58.3 -58.1 -57.9 -62.5 -3211.5 -3208.5 -2704.3 -2493.7 -789.6 -801.4 -1032.8 -1335.2
2 41.4 41.3 41.5 -8.8 -9.0 -9.3 -9.4 -9.5 17.3 24.0 27.7 -23.2 -23.0 -22.4 -22.0 -23.6 -1542.5 -1534.7 -635.7 -1589.4 -180.6 -139.5 -106.3 -634.1
1 46.0 46.2 -3.8 -3.9 -3.9 -4.0 -4.0 -4.0 14.1 17.3 -6.7 -6.8 -6.7 -6.5 -6.4 -6.7 -275.0 -274.2 -263.2 -241.8 14.2 131.0 -74.8 -65.6
0 49.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 8.8 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 12.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
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Fig. 7. Average utility of the network administrator for various observation percentage α. The color scale of the heat map is
calibrated for each kind of network respectively.
increase very quickly as da increases. As a result, for scale-free networks and the Facebook network,
the network administrator tends to choose da to be 0 to minimize the cost instead. In practice when
the network administrator cannot observe all node status, in order to reduce its probing cost, it needs
to formulate an estimation strategy that incorporates other side information. For example, in trying to
identify the source of a computer virus, part of the cost of examining every node in the suspect set can
be reduced by only examining known weak points in the network or by performing a forensic analysis
of the virus code to reduce the suspect set size.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have formulated the problems of maximizing infection spreading and source identification in a
network as a strategic game. Conditioned on the strategy of the other player, we proposed best-response
strategies for both the infection source and the network administrator in a tree network. We also derived
conditions under which a Nash equilibrium exists. In all Nash equilibria, the Jordan center estimator is
the equilibrium estimation strategy for the network administrator. We showed that the sum utility of both
players is maximized at one of these Nash equilibria.
In this work, we have assumed that the underlying network is a tree. Obtaining theoretical results for
general networks seems unlikely due to difficulties in designing an optimal infection strategy in a loopy
graph. Future work includes designing best-response strategies for the network administrator under a more
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general class of estimation strategies that may not be based on the Jordan center. It would also be of
interest to study the best-response infection and estimation strategies when infection rates are stochastic
and not fully controllable by the infection source, or when additional side information is available to the
network administrator. We have also adopted a simple game theoretic formulation in this paper where the
network administrator makes a one-shot observation of the network. It would be of interest to consider
cases where the network administrator can observe the evolution of the network [39], [40] by formulating
a multi-stage game.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We prove Theorem 2 in two steps. We first show that there exists at least one infection strategy that
can achieve ds = d¯s. We then show that there is no infection strategy that results in ds > d¯s.
Step 1: We only need to find one infection strategy that has safety margin ds = d¯s. Let u ∈ V be a
node with d(v∗, u) = d¯(t), and let D be the path from v∗ to u. Consider the following infection strategy:
set the infection rate of each edge in D to be the respective maximum infection rate, and set the infection
rates of other edges not in D to be 0. We then have ds =
⌊
d¯(t)/2
⌋
= d¯s.
Step 2: Assume ds > d¯s, i.e., ds ≥ d¯s + 1. Consider any infection strategy Λ and a Jordan center
u such that d(v∗, u) = ds and let D = (l1, . . . , u, . . . , l2) be a diameter of Gt containing u, where
l1 and l2 are leaf nodes, with d(l1, v∗) ≤ d(l2, v∗). We first show that d(v∗, u) ≤ d(l2, u). It can be
shown that d(l1, u) and d(l2, u) differs in value by at most 1 [18]. If d(l1, u) = d(l2, u) + 1, consider
the neighbouring node u′ of u on the path ρ(u, l1). From [18], we obtain that u′ is a Jordan center
with d(v∗, u′) = ds − 1, a contradiction. Therefore, we have d(l1, u) ≤ d(l2, u). It is easy to see that
d(v∗, u) ≤ d(l2, u) because otherwise, the path with ρ(v∗, u) concatenated with ρ(u, l2) has length greater
than that of D, a contradiction. We then have
d(v∗, l2) = d(v
∗, u) + d(u, l2)
≥ 2d(v∗, u)
≥ 2(d¯s + 1)
≥ d¯(t) + 1,
a contradiction since the infection can travel at most d¯(t) hops in time t. This shows that no infection
strategy results in ds > d¯s. The proof for Theorem 2 is now complete.
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Fig. 8. Illustration of part of the infection graph GI.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We call the leaf node ld of a dominant path a dominant leaf. We prove Lemma 1 in two steps. We first
show that any diameter D of GI,t contains at least one dominant leaf. We then show that the infection
rate associated with each edge in any dominant path is its upper bound λ¯m.
Step 1: Show that any diameter D of GI,t contains at least one dominant leaf.
Let l1 and l2 to be the two end nodes of D. Let vi and vj to be two different neighboring nodes of
v∗. We consider two possible scenarios: l1 and l2 are in different subtrees Tvi and Tvj , respectively; l1
and l2 are in the same subtree Tvi .
SCENARIO 1: l1 and l2 are in different subtrees Tvi and Tvj , respectively.
Suppose D does not contain any dominant leaf. Then we can find a dominant path ρ(v∗, ld) such that
ld /∈ Tvi (if ld ∈ Tvi , we have ld /∈ Tvj and just exchange the notations i and j). Consider the path
D′ = {l1, · · · , v
∗, · · · , ld}, we have
|D′| = d(v∗, l1) + d(v
∗, ld) + 1
> d(v∗, l1) + d(v
∗, l2) + 1
= |D|.
Thus, we find a path D′ that has longer distance than the diameter D, a contradiction. So D must contain
at least one dominant leaf.
SCENARIO 2: l1 and l2 are in the same subtrees Tvi .
Suppose D does not contain any dominant leaf. Consider a dominant leaf ld. If ld /∈ Tvi , following the
same argument as in Scenario 1, we can find a path D′ = {l1, · · · , v∗, · · · , ld} that has longer distance than
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D. We now consider the case where ld ∈ Tvi . Let ux to be the first node on which the two paths ρ(l1, v∗)
and ρ(l2, v∗) intersects, where x is the depth of ux and 1 ≤ x ≤ min{d(v∗, l1)− 1, d(v∗, l2)− 1}. Then
let uy to be the first node on which the two paths ρ(l1, v∗) and ρ(ld, v∗) intersects, where y is the depth of
uy and 0 ≤ y ≤ d(v∗, l1)− 1. Figure 8 shows all three possible cases: y > x, y = x and y < x. Consider
the path D′ = {ld, · · · , ux, · · · , l2}. For case 1 and case 2 in Figure 8, we have d(ux, ld) > d(ux, l1)
because d(v∗, ld) > d(v∗, l1). Similarly, for case 3 in Figure 8, we have d(ux, ld) > d(uy, ld) > d(uy, l1).
As a result, for all three cases, we have
|D′| = d(ux, ld) + d(ux, l2) + 1
> d(ux, l1) + d(ux, l2) + 1
= |D|.
We find a path D′ that has longer distance than the diameter D, a contradiction. We can now conclude
that any diameter D of GI,t contains at least one dominant leaf.
Step 2: Show that the infection rate associated with each edge in any dominant path is its upper bound
λ¯m.
Consider any dominant path Pd = ρ(v∗, ld) and suppose the infection rate of some edges in Pd are
less than λ¯m. Let D = {ld, · · · , ux, · · · , l2} to be the diameter containing ld as shown in Figure 9, where
x ≥ 0 is the depth of ux. Consider a Jordan center u such that d(v∗, u) = ds. It is easy to see that u
is at the middle of the diameter. Since d(v∗, ld) > d(v∗, l2), we have d(ux, ld) > d(ux, l2), which in
turn implies that u ∈ ρ(ux, ld). If we increase the infection rates of all edges in Pd to their maximum
rates, the length of Pd will increase and u will move further away from v∗, i.e., the safety margin will
increase as well. We can then increase the infection rates of some edges in the path ρ(ux, l2) to increase
the length of ρ(ux, l2). As a result, u will move closer to v∗ and the safety margin can reduce back to its
original value. In this case, we find another infection strategy that results in more infected nodes subject
to the same safety margin ds, a contradiction. We can now conclude that the infection rate associated
with each edge in any dominant path is its maximum rate. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Fix any diameter and let it be D. We prove Lemma 2 by contradiction. Suppose neither end of D is
in the subtree Tv1 , then there are two possible cases: (1) both ends of D are in the subtree Tvi , where
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Fig. 9. Illustration of the diameter containing the dominant leaf ld.
2 ≤ i ≤ k; (2) the two ends of D are in the subtree Tvi and Tvj , respectively, where 2 ≤ i, j ≤ k and
i 6= j.
We first consider case (1) and let l1 and l2 to be the two ends of D. Consider two paths ρ(l1, v∗)
and ρ(l2, v∗) and let the first node on which these two paths intersect as w. We can find a path D′ =
{lv1 , · · · , v
∗, · · · , w, · · · , l2} that has longer distance than D. We have
|{lv1 , · · · , v
∗, · · · , w}|
> |{lv1 , · · · , v
∗}|
= d(v∗, lv1) + 1
> d(v∗, lvi) + 1
> d(l1, u) + 1
= |{l1, · · · , u}|.
Then we have
|D′| = |{lv1 , · · · , v
∗, · · · , u}| + d(u, l2)
> |{l1, · · · , u}|+ d(u, l2)
= |D|.
We find a path that has greater length than the diameter, which contradicts with the definition of diameter.
This completes the proof for case (1).
We then consider case (2). Fix i and j, and let li and lj denote the two ends of the diameter in subtree
Tvi and Tvj , respectively. Since d(v∗, lv1) > d(v∗, lvi), the length of the path D′ = {lv1 , · · · , v∗, · · · , lvj}
is greater than the length of diameter D = {lvi , · · · , v∗, · · · , lvj}, which contradicts with the definition
of diameter. This completes the proof for case (2), and the proof for Lemma 2 is now complete.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Consider any infection strategy Λ with safety margin ds, a dominant path Pd, and that maximizes
the number of infected nodes. We use the same notations in the discussion preceding Lemma 3, with
Pd = (u0, . . . , ud¯(t)). In addition, let Tu(G) be the subtree of G rooted at node u with the first link in
the path from u to v∗ removed. Let T˜um(G) be Tum(G)\Tum+1(G).
Suppose there exists a m ∈ [0, ds] such that for a path ρ(um, l˜um), we have d(um, Tum(G)) ≥ λ′m(t−
tm), and λ′m > λm, where
λ′m = d(um, l˜um)

 ∑
(i,j)∈ρ(um,l˜um )
λ(i, j)−1


−1
,
i.e., λ′m is the average infection rate along the path ρ(um, l˜um). (Recall that λm is the average infection
rate used by DIS(ds, t) for T˜um(G).) We have⌊
λ′m(t− tm)
⌋
= d(um, l˜um),
since otherwise, we can infect more nodes, contradicting the assumption that Λ maximizes the number
of infected nodes. We also have vˆ(um) is a Jordan center. By replacing λm with λ′m in (19), we have
d(v∗, vˆ(um)) < ds since λ′m > λm implies that the inequality in (20) is reversed when λm is replaced
by λ′m. This contradicts the assumption that Λ has safety margin ds.
On the other hand, if d(um, T˜um(G)) < λ′m(t− tm), i.e., all the nodes in T˜um are infected by Λ before
time t, then we can choose a λ′′m ∈ (λ′m, λm), infect all the nodes in T˜um by time t, and repeat the above
argument using λ′′m in place of λ′m. Therefore, no other strategy can infect more nodes than DIS(ds, t),
and the proof is complete.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
We first prove the properties (a)-(c) in sequence. We then prove the sum utility optimality claim.
Proof of Theorem 5(a).
Following the definition of the Nash equilibrium, it suffices to show that
ua(0,Λ0) ≥ ua(da,Λ0), ∀da > 0, (29)
us(0,Λ0) ≥ us(0,Λ), ∀Λ. (30)
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The inequality (29) follows from Theorem 1. To show (30), let Λ be any infection strategy, and ds be
its safety margin. If ds = 0, we obtain from Lemma 4
us(0,Λ0) = gs|VI(Λ0)| − cs(0)
≥ gs|VI(Λ)| − cs(0)
= us(0,Λ).
If ds > 0, from the assumption of Theorem 5(a) and Lemma 4, we have for any Λ1 ∈ M(1),
us(0,Λ0) ≥ us(0,Λ1)
= gs|VI(Λ1)|
≥ gs|VI(Λ)|
= us(0,Λ).
The proof of Theorem 5(a) is now complete.
Proof of Theorem 5(b).
It again suffices to show that for Λ1 ∈ M(1, tobs) satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 5(b), we
have
ua(0,Λ1) ≥ ua(da,Λ1), ∀da > 0, (31)
us(0,Λ1) ≥ us(0,Λ), ∀Λ. (32)
From the second assumption of Theorem 5(b), for any da > 0, we have
ua(0,Λ1) ≥ ua(1,Λ1)
= −ca(Vsp(1)) + ga(1, VI(Λ1))
≥ −ca(Vsp(da)) + ga(da, VI(Λ1))
= ua(da,Λ1),
and inequality (31) holds.
We now show (32). Let Λ be any infection strategy and ds be its safety margin. If ds = 0, from the
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first assumption of Theorem 5(b), and Definition 1, we have
us(0,Λ1) ≥ us(0,Λ0)
= gs|VI(Λ0)| − cs(0)
≥ gs|VI(Λ)| − cs(0)
= us(0,Λ).
If ds > 0, from Lemma 4, we have
us(0,Λ1) = gs|VI(Λ1)|
≥ gs|VI(Λ)|
= us(0,Λ).
We have now shown that (32) holds and the proof of Theorem 5(b) is complete.
Proof of Theorem 5(c).
Consider any strategy pair (da,Λ) 6= (0,Λ0) or (0,Λ1) for all Λ1 ∈ M(1, tobs). Let ds be the safety
margin of Λ. If da = 0 and ds = 0, then
us(0,Λ) = gs|VI(Λ)| − cs(0)
< gs|VI(Λ0)| − cs(0)
= us(0,Λ0),
so (da,Λ) is not a Nash equilibrium. If da = 0 and ds ≥ 1, we have us(0,Λ) = gs|VI(Λ)| < gs|VI(Λ1)|
for any Λ1 ∈ M(1, tobs). This again implies that (da,Λ) is not a Nash equilibrium.
Now suppose that da > 0. From Theorem 4, it suffices to show that (da,Λ0) and (da,Λda+1) for all
Λda+1 ∈ M(da + 1, tobs) are not Nash equilibria. We have
ua(da,Λ0) = −ca(Vsp(da)) + ga(da, VI(Λ0)
< −ca(Vsp(0)) + ga(0, VI(Λ0))
= ua(0,Λ0),
where the inequality follows from the assumption that d¯s > 0. For each Λda+1 ∈ M(da + 1, tobs), we
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have
ua(da,Λda+1) = −ca(Vsp(da + 1))
< −ca(Vsp(0))
= ua(0,Λda+1).
This completes the proof of Theorem 5(c).
Proof of sum utility optimality.
It suffices to show that for any strategy pair (da,Λ) and every Λ1 ∈ M(1, tobs), we have
ua(da,Λ) + us(da,Λ) ≤ max{ua(0,Λ0) + us(0,Λ0), ua(0,Λ1) + us(0,Λ1)}. (33)
Let ds be the safety margin of Λ. We first consider the case where da < ds. Following (7), (8),
Definition 1 and Lemma 4, we have for any Λ1 ∈M(1, tobs),
ua(da,Λ) + us(da,Λ) = −ca(da) + gs|VI(Λ)|
≤ −ca(0) + gs|VI(Λ1)|
= ua(0,Λ1) + us(0,Λ1).
This implies that (33) holds for all Λ1 ∈ M(1, tobs).
Suppose now that da ≥ ds. Following (7), (8), Definition 1 and Lemma 4, we have
ua(da,Λ) + us(da,Λ) = −ca(da) + ga(da) + gs|VI(Λ)| − cs(da)
≤ −ca(0) + ga(0) + gs|VI(Λ0)| − cs(0)
= ua(0,Λ0) + us(0,Λ0).
This implies that (33) holds. The proof of Theorem 5 is now complete.
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